

CANADIAN PUGWASH CALLS FOR NATO TO DENUCLEARIZE

CANADIAN PUGWASH is the national organization representing the Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs, founded in Pugwash, Nova Scotia in 1957. The Pugwash movement and its founder, Sir Josef Rotblat, were awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 1995 for their efforts in support of nuclear disarmament. In July 2007, eminent experts from both the natural and the social sciences will meet in Pugwash village in Nova Scotia to mark the 50th anniversary of the organization's founding and to discuss "Revitalizing Nuclear Disarmament". Recognizing that NATO's nuclear weapons policies are outdated and dangerous, the Canadian Pugwash Group is asking the Canadian government to use its resources and reputation to lead NATO countries on a path toward denuclearization.

www.pugwashgroup.ca



Participants in the first Pugwash Conference of Nuclear Scientists in Pugwash from July 2 to 15, 1957. Came of 12 of the most concerned countries, including the USSR and the People's Republic of China. Statement issued at the end of the conference warned governments of world that misuse of nuclear energy could lead to annihilation of mankind. Reading statement on CBC hook-up in front of Thinkers' Lodge is Professor J. Rotblat of Great Britan with Professor A.M.B. Lacassagne of France's Institute du Radium at left and Cyrus Eaton and Professor V.D. Skobel'tzyn of Soviet Academy of Sciences at right.



First Pugwash Conference of Nuclear Scientists, Pugwash, Nova Scotia, July 6-10, 1957. Standing at the entrance of the Masonic Temple, left to right, (back row) A.M.B. Lacassagne; A.M. Kuzin; E. Rabinowitch; D.V. Skobel'tzyn; Cyrus Eaton; J. Rotblat; (front row) I. Ogawa; Chou Pei-Yuan; V.P. Pavlichenko; S. Tomonaga; C.F. Powell; A.V. Topchiev; G. Brock Chisholm; J.S. Foster; H.J. Muller; H. Thirring; L. Szilard; W. Selove; E.H.S. Burhop; M.L.E. Oliphant; M. Danysz.



Thinkers' Lodge, the Cyrus Eaton property in Pugwash, Nova Scotia. Site of the first Pugwash conference in 1957.

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The dangers posed by nuclear weapons are once again on the increase. A nuclear war is the sole human-made catastrophe that could end our civilization in a single day, any day of any year. Nuclear arsenals remain enormous, nuclear capabilities are spreading, and the likelihood of the use of nuclear weapons is growing.

The Canadian government recognizes that the total elimination of nuclear weapons is the “only sustainable strategy for the future.”¹ But it also continues to support, and to be constrained by, NATO nuclear weapons policies that ascribe “essential” roles to nuclear weapons and call for the retention of NATO nuclear arsenals for the “foreseeable future”. Fealty to these NATO policies greatly reduces the freedom of action and potential effectiveness of Canada and the other NATO non-nuclear-weapon states in working toward the goals of nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament. The Canadian Pugwash Group therefore urges the Canadian government to take the lead in rallying like-minded NATO members to press for denuclearization of the NATO alliance as a key step toward the elimination of all nuclear weapons worldwide.

The Position of Canada and Other Non-Nuclear-Weapon States

As expressed in its charter, the primary task of NATO is security for its members. At NATO’s formation, Canada and other non-nuclear-weapon states (NNWS) entered into an alliance with the United States, the only nuclear-weapon state (NWS) then in existence (NATO now includes three NWS). Some years later, the international community agreed that nuclear disarmament, over time, was a necessity, and that such disarmament would be facilitated through the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). When NATO members then ratified the NPT, they introduced a fundamental conflict because they were committed to the doctrine of nuclear deterrence at the same time as being committed to non-proliferation and disarmament.

The Non-Proliferation Treaty remains the cornerstone of the international nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament regime. Non-nuclear-weapon states (NNWS) party to the treaty are required to forgo the acquisition of nuclear weapons, while the nuclear-weapon states (NWS) are required to negotiate—and achieve—complete nuclear disarmament. All of the 190 parties to the treaty are responsible for the full implementation of its provisions.²

These obligations are currently being flouted. No substantive nuclear disarmament negotiations are underway. And while most NWS have reduced the size of their nuclear arsenals since the end of the Cold War, all intend to retain sizeable nuclear forces for the foreseeable future (many thousands of warheads in the cases of the U.S. and Russia), and all have modernization programs underway or in planning. Thousands of U.S. and Russian weapons remain on hair-trigger alert, posing an ongoing threat of accidental war, and the U.S. missile defence program is creating new tensions with Russia and China.

Meanwhile, the broader non-proliferation regime is eroding. The START II and ABM treaties are dead; the future of the INF treaty is seriously threatened; the START I treaty is soon to expire; the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty remains in limbo, unable to enter into force; and the multilateral Conference on Disarmament has been deadlocked for almost

1. *Nuclear Disarmament and Non-Proliferation: Advancing Canadian Objectives*, Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, April 1999, p. 1.

2. *Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons* (<http://disarmament.un.org/wmd/npt/index.html>). The disarmament obligation is spelled out in Article VI of the treaty. In 1996, the International Court of Justice reaffirmed this obligation, and the obligation of all treaty parties to pursue its fulfillment, in its Advisory Opinion on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons (<http://ialana.net/wcp.html#icj>).

a decade, preventing negotiations on the proposed Fissile Materials Cutoff Treaty and other measures from even beginning. Nuclear capabilities are spreading. Three non-parties to the NPT, India, Israel, and Pakistan, possess nuclear weapons. North Korea, a former NPT party, also possesses nuclear weapons, and a current NPT party, Iran, appears to be pursuing nuclear weapons. Other parties may also be considering their acquisition. The possibility of terrorist acquisition of a bomb also cannot be ruled out. The doctrine of Mutual Assured Destruction has no viability for deterring an act of nuclear terrorism.

Canadian Pugwash asserts that retaining nuclear weapons not only has the effect of driving formerly non-nuclear-weapon states to plan to equip themselves with nuclear weapons, but also increases the probability of access by terrorists, while running the risk of starting a new arms race with Russia or China. All countries—the five NPT nuclear-weapon states (the U.S., U.K., France, Russia, and China), the NPT non-nuclear-weapon states, and the states that remain outside the NPT—must act to end the nuclear threat.

NATO Nuclear Policies

NATO's nuclear weapons policies pose a major obstacle to nuclear disarmament efforts. Only three of the 26 member countries of NATO are nuclear-weapon states, but NATO's nuclear weapons policies make the remaining 23 members of the alliance, in effect if not in name, associate nuclear-weapon states rather than true non-nuclear-weapon states. Under NATO's "Strategic Concept", the members of NATO endorse:

- Indefinite retention of nuclear weapons by the NATO NWS;
- Retention of the option to use nuclear weapons in conflict, including possible first-use of nuclear weapons and use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon states;
- Stationing of nuclear weapons at NATO sites in Europe and maintenance of "nuclear-sharing" arrangements with five NATO NNWS; and
- Continuation of these nuclear policies for the "foreseeable future".³

The Strategic Concept Directly Implicates the NATO NNWS in NATO's Nuclear Plans and Force Posture:

A credible Alliance nuclear posture and the demonstration of alliance solidarity and common commitment to war prevention continue to require widespread participation by European Allies involved in collective defence planning in nuclear roles, in peacetime basing of nuclear forces on their territory and in command, control and consultation arrangements. Nuclear forces based in Europe and committed to NATO provide an essential political and military link between the European and the North American members of the Alliance. The Alliance will therefore maintain adequate nuclear forces in Europe.⁴

3. "The Alliance's Strategic Concept," *NATO Press Release NAC-S(99)65*, 24 April 1999 (<http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/1999/p99-065e.htm>); see esp. paras. 42, 46, and 62–64.

4. "The Alliance's Strategic Concept," para. 63.

In fulfillment of these policies, U.S. tactical nuclear weapons are deployed in six European NATO countries, five of which are NNWS. All five—Belgium, Italy, Germany, the Netherlands, and Turkey.⁵ — have “nuclear-sharing” agreements with the U.S., under which they maintain aircraft equipped to carry nuclear weapons and pilots trained to deliver them. U.S. nuclear weapons under U.S. custody are stored in Europe for these aircraft. If a decision were made by NATO to use these weapons, they would be delivered by the air forces of these five supposedly non-nuclear-weapon states.

NATO claims that these arrangements are compatible with the Non-Proliferation Treaty. However, the provisions of articles I and II of the NPT prohibit the transfer by NWS and the receipt by NNWS of any kind of direct or indirect control over nuclear weapons, and many NPT parties do not accept the NATO claim that nuclear-sharing arrangements are legal.⁶ (It is also important to note that the use or threatened use of nuclear weapons would generally be illegal under the international laws applicable to armed conflict.)⁷

Because of the alliance’s nuclear policies, NATO expansion is itself a form of nuclear proliferation. All new members of the alliance are required to accept NATO’s nuclear policies: “New members are full members of the Alliance in all respects, including their commitment to the Alliance’s policy on nuclear weapons and the guarantees which that policy affords to all Allies.”⁸ NATO’s recent growth has thus significantly increased the number of countries implicated in the command, control, maintenance, and operation of nuclear forces and explicitly committed to the indefinite retention of nuclear weapons.

Relations Between NATO and Russia

Russia, a NWS, is not a NATO member, and it is opposed to NATO’s expansion in Eastern Europe. It also opposes the U.S. plan⁹ to install elements of a ballistic missile defence system in two NATO countries, 10 interceptor missiles in Poland and a radar in the Czech Republic, despite U.S. insistence that the plan is aimed at the threat of an Iranian missile reaching Europe. The strained relations created by this close-to-the-Russian-border deployment have been used by Russia to justify aggressive statements, for example, about ceasing commitments under the treaty regarding Conventional Forces in Europe. Although not a NATO project, the proposed missile defence deployment is another example of how the nuclear-related policies of NATO countries are leading to an increase in global tensions.

5. Greece was also a participant until recently. In 2001, it quietly withdrew from the arrangement and the U.S. weapons were removed. For more information on NATO nuclear weapons and “nuclear-sharing” arrangements, see Hans M. Kristensen, *U.S. Nuclear Weapons in Europe*, Natural Resources Defense Council, February 2005 (<http://www.nrdc.org/nuclear/euro/contents.asp>).

6. *Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons*, articles I and II. For more information on the controversy over nuclear sharing and the NPT, see Martin Butcher, Otfried Nassauer, Tanya Padberg, and Dan Plesch, Questions of Command and Control: NATO, Nuclear Sharing and the NPT, PENN Research Report 2000.1, Project on European Nuclear Non-Proliferation, March 2000 (<http://www.basicint.org/pubs/Research/2000nuclearsharing1.htm>). Inasmuch as the NATO Nuclear Planning Group and NATO decisionmaking apparatus as a whole represent a degree of command and control over nuclear weapons, as the Strategic Concept itself asserts (see para. 63), all NATO members could be considered to be in violation of these provisions of the treaty.

7. Advisory Opinion on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, para. 105 (2) (F) (<http://ialana.net/wcp.html#icj>).

8. “NATO’s Nuclear Forces in the New Security Environment,” *NATO Fact Sheet*, 4 June 2004 (<http://www.nato.int/issues/nuclear/sec-environment.htm>).

9. “Missile Test,” *Washington Post* editorial, 2 May 2007 (<http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/05/01/AR2007050101573.html>).

Nuclear Weapons Policies of NATO's Nuclear-Weapon States

The Strategic Concept also links the NATO NNWS to the overall nuclear policies of the NATO NWS (i.e., not just to collective alliance policies), asserting that “The supreme guarantee of the security of the Allies is provided by the strategic nuclear forces of the Alliance, particularly those of the United States; the independent nuclear forces of the United Kingdom and France, which have a deterrent role of their own, contribute to the overall deterrence and security of the Allies.”¹⁰ The nuclear policies of these NATO NWS also run counter to the requirements of nuclear disarmament. It is disingenuous for the NWS in NATO to argue that the nuclear forces of the U.K. and France should not be considered in any discussions of NATO's nuclear planning. Just as the NNWS in NATO rely on the United States' ultimate deterrent, the NATO allies rely upon the U.K. and French nuclear forces to back up and reinforce U.S. nuclear policies.

U.S. Policies

Although it has said that it will reduce its nuclear stockpile to approximately 5,000 warheads over the next five years, the U.S. remains committed to the indefinite retention of extensive and capable nuclear forces. The current U.S. administration intends to renew and augment the U.S. nuclear stockpile with a new nuclear warhead design (or designs) under the Reliable Replacement Warhead (RRW) program¹¹ and to make major upgrades to its nuclear weapons complex. The U.S. Congress is considering a request for funds so that this long term and extensive program can begin in 2008, even though expert investigation shows that there are no significant signs of aging in the present stockpile. Studies have also begun for new intercontinental ballistic missiles, new strategic bombers, and new missile submarines.¹²

Recent developments in the U.S. nuclear posture have also gone in the wrong direction. Increased emphasis on pre-emption options in U.S. war planning, efforts to develop “more usable” nuclear weapons, increased use of threats to use nuclear weapons against NNWS¹³ (threats that violate longstanding Negative Security Assurances), the drive to deploy missile defences, steps toward the weaponization of space,¹⁴ and the current administration's antipathy to nuclear arms control all undermine the prospects for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament progress.

The U.S., by virtue of its strength and financial contribution to NATO, has always had a primary influence on NATO's policies. To move toward a more secure world, NATO nuclear policies must be disconnected from the nuclear policies of the United States.

10. “The Alliance's Strategic Concept,” para. 62.

11. “The Future of Nuclear Weapons: The Weapons Complex and the Reliable Replacement Warhead (RRW),” Arms Control Association, 19 April 2007 (http://www.armscontrol.org/events/20070419_transcript_rrw.asp).

12. “U.S. nuclear forces, 2007,” *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, January/February 2007 (<http://thebulletin.metapress.com/content/91n36687821608un/fulltext.pdf>).

13. The 2002 Nuclear Posture Review stated, for example, that “U.S. nuclear forces will continue to provide assurance to security partners, particularly in the presence of known or suspected threats of nuclear, biological, or chemical attacks or in the event of surprising military developments.” See *Nuclear Posture Review (Excerpts)*, January 2002 (<http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/library/policy/dod/npr.htm>).

14. *U.S. National Space Policy*, 31 August 2006 (http://www.globalsecurity.org/space/library/policy/national/us-space-policy_060831.pdf).

French Policies

Although much smaller than the U.S. and Russian arsenals, France's nuclear arsenal is the world's third largest, containing about 350 warheads. The bulk of its arsenal is in the Force Océanique Stratégique. France is planning new warheads on new versions of its cruise and submarine-launched missiles. In 2010–2015, four Triomphant-class submarines will be retrofitted with the 6,000-km-range M51.1 submarine-launched ballistic missile.¹⁵ The planned deployment of these technically more advanced nuclear systems runs counter to France's nuclear disarmament obligations under the NPT.

British Policies

The U.K. nuclear arsenal contains about 200 warheads, all carried on Trident II missiles based on Vanguard-class submarines.¹⁶ In December 2006, the British government announced that it intends to begin work on a new generation of missile submarines to be deployed around 2025.¹⁷ There is considerable opposition within the U.K. to this plan, however, and a parliamentary motion in favour of the replacement passed in March 2007 only because it had the support of the Conservative opposition.¹⁸

Like the French modernization plans, the decision to replace Trident (and thus remain a nuclear-weapon state) is at odds with Britain's nuclear disarmament obligations. By renewing the Trident system, Britain has missed the opportunity to lead NATO toward denuclearization.

Ending the Contradictory Nuclear Weapons Policies in NATO

The Canadian government places considerable emphasis on the twin goals of nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament. But continuing fealty to NATO's nuclear weapons policies greatly reduces the freedom of action and potential effectiveness of Canada and the other NATO NNWS in working toward these goals. Reform of NATO's nuclear policies is thus vitally important.

Canada and the other NATO NNWS need to place the reform of NATO nuclear weapons policies at the top of their nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation agenda. Discussions have already begun within NATO's Nuclear Planning Group on how to reform NATO's nuclear policies in time for NATO's 60th anniversary celebrations in 2009. This would be an appropriate occasion to announce NATO's decision to de-emphasize, indeed eliminate, nuclear use from its arsenal of possible options. The Canadian Pugwash Group urges Canada to take the lead in this regard, using its considerable influence and resources to immediately press NATO to plan and achieve nuclear disarmament. We urge Canada to rally long-time NATO allies, like Belgium, Germany, Italy, and the Netherlands, to be at the forefront of the discussions to change NATO's policies.

15. "French Nuclear Forces, 2005," *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, July/August 2005 (<http://thebulletin.metapress.com/content/n8rn0x5567572723/fulltext.pdf>).

16. "British Nuclear Forces, 2005," *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, November/December 2005 (<http://thebulletin.metapress.com/content/k52425n3320m8644/fulltext.pdf>).

17. The Future of the United Kingdom's Nuclear Deterrent, December 2006 (http://www.mod.uk/NR/rdonlyres/AC00DD79-76D6-4FE3-91A1-6A56B03C092F/0/DefenceWhitePaper2006_Cm6994.pdf).

18. Kate Hudson, "A nuclear shift on Trident?," *New Statesman*, 24 April 2007 (<http://www.newstatesman.com/200704240006>).

Under the Chrétien government, Foreign Affairs Minister Lloyd Axworthy worked along these lines, challenging his NATO colleagues to move forward on nuclear disarmament. Little concrete change was accomplished at that time, but Canada and like-minded countries, like Germany, did manage to obtain agreement within the alliance to conduct a review of its nuclear disarmament-related policies.¹⁹ This review,²⁰ which was completed in 2000, sidestepped the main issues in NATO nuclear policy, but reaffirmed NATO members' commitment to the fulfillment of their NPT obligations and formally stated their support for the "13 Practical Steps" towards nuclear disarmament that were agreed by the NPT parties at the treaty's 2000 Review Conference.²¹ (The 13 Practical Steps remain the foundation "recipe" for nuclear disarmament within the international community.)²²

What the review did not do was reconcile the contradictions between support for the 13 Practical Steps and broader NPT obligations—including, for example, the "unequivocal undertaking" given by the NWS "to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals"—and NATO's nuclear policies, which call for the retention of nuclear weapons for the "foreseeable future". NATO governments continue to evade serious discussion of the contradiction between their advocacy of the NPT and their support for the nuclear policies spelled out in the Strategic Concept. On 9 June 2005, for example, NATO defence ministers reaffirmed "the continued validity of the fundamental principles governing NATO's nuclear policy and force posture as set out in the Strategic Concept."²³ Yet in June 2005, representatives from these same countries met in New York City to reaffirm their support for the main provisions of the NPT (to no avail as the Review Conference ended in disagreement).

It is not possible for these contradictory positions to remain forever. Something must give, and indeed things have been giving. The current U.S. administration has withdrawn U.S. support for several of the 13 Practical Steps in recent years (without, it should be noted, immediately endeavouring to bring the issue back before the NATO allies), and globally the credibility of the nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament regime continues to erode.

19. Greece's withdrawal from nuclear-sharing may also have been influenced by the discussions at that time.

20. "Report on Options for Confidence and Security Building measures (CSBMs), Verification, Non-Proliferation, Arms Control and Disarmament," NATO Press Release M-NAC-2(2000)121, December 2000 (<http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2000/p00-121e/home.htm>).

21. The full text of the 13 Practical Steps was incorporated into the NATO report. See "Report on Options for Confidence and Security Building measures (CSBMs), Verification, Non-Proliferation, Arms Control and Disarmament," para. 106 (<http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2000/p00-121e/0502.htm>).

22. The Middle Powers Initiative (<http://www.middlepowers.org/mpi/index.html>) recently condensed the concepts in the 13 Practical Steps into seven proposed priorities for action: verified reduction of nuclear forces; standing down of nuclear forces (de-alerting); negotiation of a Fissile Materials Cutoff Treaty; bringing the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty into force; strengthened Negative Security Assurances; regulation of nuclear fuel production and supply; and improved NPT governance; see "Toward 2010, Priorities for NPT Consensus," Middle Powers Initiative Paper for the 2007 NPT Preparatory Committee, Vienna, April 2007 (http://www.gsinsitute.org/mpi/docs/Towards_2010.pdf).

23. "Final Communiqué: Ministerial Meeting of the Defence Planning Committee and the Nuclear Planning Group held in Brussels on Thursday, 9 June 2005," *NATO Press Release* (2005)075, 9 June 2005 (<http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2005/p05-075e.htm>). The most recent Nuclear Planning Group meeting, on 8 June 2006, also reaffirmed the general principles of NATO nuclear policy, although without explicit reference to the Strategic Concept. See "Final Communiqué: Ministerial Meeting of the Defence Planning Committee and the Nuclear Planning Group held in Brussels on Thursday, 8 June 2006," NATO Press Release (2006)063, 8 June 2006 (<http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2006/p06-063e.htm>).

Canada and the other NATO NNWS must not remain silent as the contradictions between NATO's nuclear policies and the world's nuclear disarmament priorities undermine our collective ability to make progress on nuclear disarmament. Every meeting of NATO defence ministers, NATO foreign ministers, and the NATO Council should be working step-by-step toward nuclear disarmament. In particular, Canada and like-minded allies should insist that discussion of NATO's nuclear disarmament be placed on the agenda of the Nuclear Planning Group as a urgent matter.²⁴

Voices Around the World

We are raising the alarm in concert with other voices around the world. The Canadian Pugwash Group is not alone in the realization that there is no place for nuclear weapons within any security strategy. There has been a "sea change" in international opinion, and NATO needs to catch up.

Earlier this year, four prominent U.S. "Cold Warriors", former secretaries of state George Schultz and Henry Kissinger, former secretary of defense William Perry, and former senator Sam Nunn, came together to propose "A World Free of Nuclear Weapons." They urged that the U.S. provide leadership to "take the world to the next stage—to a solid consensus for reversing reliance on nuclear weapons globally as a vital contribution to preventing their proliferation into potentially dangerous hands, and ultimately ending them as a threat to the world."²⁵

On 17 April 2007, Canadian Senator Romeo Dallaire presented a resolution to the Senate proposing "That the Senate call on the Government of Canada to take a leading role in the reinvigoration of the urgent matter of nuclear disarmament." Senator Dallaire eloquently argued in support of the abolition of nuclear weapons. All participating in the subsequent debate supported him, and when the vote was called, the resolution was passed unanimously.

The member organizations of the Canadian Network to Abolish Nuclear Weapons (CNANW) have also supported the call for the Canadian government to act.²⁶ International Physicians for Global Survival has launched a major campaign under the acronym ICAN (International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons).²⁷ Other disarmament organizations are active in Canada and in many other countries around the world on this issue.

24. For recent recommendations on related nuclear disarmament issues, see *A comprehensive report with recommendations for global security policies*, Canadian Pugwash Group and Science for Peace, 15 November 2006 (http://www.pugwashgroup.ca/events/documents/2006/2006.11-CFGS_NATO_report.pdf).

25. George P. Schultz, William J. Perry, Henry A. Kissinger, and Sam Nunn, "A World Free of Nuclear Weapons," *Wall Street Journal*, 4 January 2007 (<http://yaleglobal.yale.edu/article.print?id=8592>).

26. For more information on the Canadian Network to Abolish Nuclear Weapons, see the network's website (<http://www.web.net/~cnanw/>).

27. See the International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons website (<http://www.icanw.org/>).

Conclusion

Canada should continue working to re-open the debate on NATO nuclear policy in light of the current grave threats to the continued viability of the NPT. To move toward a more secure world, NATO nuclear policies must be disconnected from the nuclear policies of the United States

We ask the Government of Canada to take advantage of its reputation as a nation that promotes international cooperation and rally a group of NATO members to promote and support the denuclearization of NATO. An appropriate target year for NATO's repudiation of the nuclear policies spelled out in the Strategic Concept is 2009, 60 years after the formation of NATO.

We assert that this is an attainable beginning goal, and that with such an achievement, the end goal of nuclear disarmament would be within reach.

Important Updates

Canadian Pugwash has made its call for change in NATO nuclear policies a central part of its 50th anniversary activities. We expressed our concerns in a letter to Minister of Foreign Affairs Peter Mackay, who responded by telling the House of Commons (8 May 2007) that he took the opportunity at a recent NATO meeting in Oslo to discuss the subject with Germany's foreign minister; he went on to acknowledge that the subject matter is very important to all Canadians.

In addition to working cooperatively with other groups in Canada through the CNANW, Canadian Pugwash is seeking the cooperation of Pugwash groups in other NATO countries and is receiving a host of supportive responses. Our quest to raise awareness and initiate action is continuing with a series of meetings with ambassadors at their embassies in Ottawa.

"What the weapon States consistently fail to take into account is the impact of their actions. Whether they choose to continue their reliance on nuclear weapons, as the centerpiece of their security strategy, or to abandon that reliance, their choice will undoubtedly influence the actions of others.... Every country, irrespective of its ideology or orientation, will do what it takes to feel secure, including through seeking to acquire nuclear weapons. This is the stark reality, moral equivalence aside. What makes this more dangerous is that, in an era of globalization and interdependence, the insecurity of some will inevitably lead to the insecurity of all. The solution, therefore, in my view, lies in creating an environment in which nuclear weapons are universally banned, morally abhorred, and their futility unmasked."

Dr. Mohamed ElBaradei, IAEA Director General, speaking at the International Conference on the Prevention of Nuclear Catastrophe, Luxembourg, May 24, 2007

THE CANADIAN PUGWASH GROUP

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